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August 29, 1998
INTRODUCTION
In light of recent events in Nigeria, resulting in and/or accentuating various security and marginalization concerns among many of its peoples,and in order to reverse internal colonisalism and prevent military coups in the future, it is now almost an accepted fact that our present political and military arrangements MUST BE RE-STRUCTURED.
This fact has become self-evident to all but the few who appear to be gaining some
advantage from the status-quo.
Central to the proposals that are presented below is the Regionalization of the political administration of the country (to grant the regions or political zones greater autonomy in a manner faithful to true federalism), and the Regionalization of the command structure of a United army in a manner to be specified below.
Despite certain loud concerns now coming from expected quarters, a Regionalized Army of a united and democratic Federal Republic of Nigeria will eventually be organized in Nigeria. The
only question is when, and what further political bridges (Sovereign National Conference? etc.) must still be crossed to get there.
But how will a New Nigeria and its army be organized? Some thoughts based on my original thinking and distilled from others will be discussed below,along with some clarifications based on questions that may arise.
However, since these proposals touch on the very core of Nigeria's corporate existence, it is important first to note the following:
- in the argument over "regionalization" and "decentralization", while the need for decentralization is often based on efficiency, regionalization in the Nigerian setting is a decentralization method that in addition to efficiency also begins to address the issue of ethnic imbalance in the army in the quickest possible manner.
- regionalization of a united army is no precondition for secession; the history of secessions in the world have not had as precursors a formal regionalization; if a region is hell-bent on seceding, it will do so, regionalization or no regionalization;
- the disintegration of Nigeria is not INCONCEIVABLE, first because Nigeria was put together WITHOUT a plebiscite of the Nigerian people, who 84 years later could DEMOCRATICALLY choose to go their separate ways and secondly, the reckless arrogance of a Nigerian oligarchy with a military wing could still make it a distinct possibility;
- a united and democratic Nigeria is infinitely better than dozens or couple of dozens of mini-states, hence there is not only a need to allay the fears of those who fear secession, but to make it more difficult for those who might capriciously plan it;
- there is certainly a need to emphasise not only group rights in Nigeria, but also individual rights, in order to in time de-emphasize the clamor for ethnic rights.
However the central and OVERWHELMING concern has been THE FEAR, quite justifiable and rational, that the proposals may increase the possibility not only for war-like tension between the regions, but for outright secession by one of the regions.
That fear is an activation energy that some readers may not be able to scale in order to discuss some of the more positive aspects of my suggestions, because for them the disintegration of Nigeria is inconceivable, although I suspect that for some of them, it is
because the status quo is more acceptable.
THE 21-POINT SET OF SUGGESTIONS
Suggestion 1:
The Nigerian political administration will be based on six political regions: South-West (Lagos, Ondo, Ogun, Oyo, Oshun and Ekiti States), South-South (Bayelsa, Edo, Delta, Cross-River, Rivers, Akwa-Ibom), South-East (Imo, Anambra, Enugu, Ebonyi, Abia), North-East (Borno, Yobe, Gombe, Adamawa, Bauchi, Taraba), North-West (Katsina, Zamfara, Sokoto, Kebbi, Jigawa, Kaduna and Kano) and North-Central (or Middle-Belt - Benue, Plateau, Nassarawa, Niger, Kogi and Kwara); and the Federal Capital Territory (FCT - Abuja).
Clarification 1.1:
Towns and villages within 100 miles of the present borders of the designated political regions should be allowed to vote (by a popular plebiscite; 67% and above for passage) to decide which of the zones to their north, east, west or south that they choose. Others with definite cultural ties to some zones other than where they find themselves should also be allowed to do the same.
So if the Yoruba in Kogi or Kwara, or the Igbo in Anioma or Ikwerre in Rivers choose to go with South-West rather than North-Central, or with South-East rather than South-South respectively, that will be their democratic choice.
Clarification 1.2
Although the issue of six political zones hearkens to one of the recommendations of the discredited Abacha 1995 constitution, the call for division of Nigeria into 6 - 9 regions long predates that constitution, and that desirable division was in fact scuttled in deference to the creation of 3 regions when Nigeria attained independence in 1960.
Suggestion 2
There will be the National President as Commander-in-Chief of the Nigerian Joint Armed Forces, and a National Vice-President, both elected on a joint presidential ticket, with full civilian control of the Armed Forces, in consultation with a Joint Armed Forces Council of Nigeria (JAFCON). A single six-year term would be applicable.
Clarification 2:
A single term allows for faster power-sharing as far as the presidential level is concerned. However, a maximum 2-time, 4-year-per-term presidency is also conceivable.
Suggestion 3:
A "Prodigal Son" Kick-Off Fund for the Regions
The regions require greater autonomy - ability to control their resources and set their own priorities for development. To jump-start each of them off, we place on the table ALL POSSIBLE ANTICIPATED FINANCIAL EARNINGS - essentially from oil, agriculture and minerals - from within Nigeria for the next fourteen years, and divide by seven to arrive at an amount.
We then grant each region and the Federal government - through a combination of outright cash, international credit and other finacnial instruments, etc. - this equal amount. From then on, ALL RESOURCES belong to the regions for them to manage, and they simply pay taxes to a Federal purse.
Clarification 3
This device can be revisited every 14 years, to see how each region and the Federal Government is doing economically, socially and politically, and to make adjustments for the disadvantaged regions accordingly. It may even become a deca-quadriennal (?) Sovereign National Conference to examine the health of the nation.
[The term "Prodigal Son" hearkens to a Biblical story of a young man who asked for his inheritance before his father's death. The father agreed. Unfortunately, the young man squandered the inheritance in dissolute living, and returned to his father's accepting arms years later, rather contrite. The regions are not
expected to be similarly profligate.]
Suggestion 4
There will be six Regional 2nd Vice-Presidents, each elected by their respective regions. Actually, each region would have a Governors' Council, with the Chairman (rotating among the governors) serving as 2nd Vice-President for that region for a given period of time.
No two individuals among the eight - one National President, one National Vice-President and six regional vice-presidents - shall come from the same state. These eight individuals along with the National Cabinet (chosen by the President) should form the National Executive Council.
Clarification 4
With a six-year single term and one-year regional VP rotational term, ALL the regions will have an opportunity for 2nd VPship during the term of any one National President, except for the two states from which the National President and Vice-President come.
Suggestion 5
The Exclusive List for the Federal Government should be as short as possible (Border Defence, Currency, Foreign Policy, Patents, Inter-State Disputes, Federal Taxation, Educational Standards, Census, etc.) and the Concurrent List (Regional + Federal) should be as long as possible to ensure greater autonomy to the Regions.
Clarification 5
No further clarification at this time.
Suggestion 6
Each region will have an equal number of no more than 9,000 members of the Armed Forces each, with equal distribution of battalions, depots, armories, training facilities, etc. Each region will determine how to distribute these members among the Army, Navy and Air Force, and between the Reserves and the Standing Army.
Clarification 6
A maximum armed forces size of 54,000 implies a 28% reduction in total size from the current total of about 75,000.
Suggestion 7
Each region will have at least one major Army training facility and one Navy, Air Force or Police training facility, open to all Nigerians.
Clarification 7
Each zone will choose ONE of Navy, Air Force or Police training facility, in addition to its MANDATORY Army training facility. However, Nigerians from ALL zones can choose to train in ANY of the facilities. That is, for example, the Army training facility in the South-West is open to Nigerians, for example, from the North-East, even though after training he may have to return to his North-East zone for service.
Suggestion 8
A largely barrack-less army
Except for
- barracks for security forces in border outposts,
- one barrack close to the capital of each state, and
- others in regional training facilities,
no less than 50% of members of the armed forces should live among the people. No member of the armed forces should live in the barracks for more than six months in a year.
Clarification 8
The aim of this suggestion is obvious: to enable the security forces (including the police) to identify closer with the communities in which they reside. Although there is argument for ease of training and rapid deployment in the maintenance of a fully-barracked army, it appears that there is a colonial history of barrack formation from which we must get
away: isolation for indoctrination against a forcefully-controlled native population.
Suggestion 9
No less than one-third, possibly half, of the members of each Regional Army should be stationed in barracks beyond 50 miles from borders with neighboring (or nearest-neighbor) country.
Clarification 9
This is to emphasise their external aggression defence role. Soldiers within each region BUT at the borders with neighboring countries should be placed, and under command of the non-indigenous 2nd-Deputy Regional Commander (see Suggestion 12 below.)
Suggestion 10
80% of the members of the regional Armed Forces must come from the
particular zone, 4% from each of the other five zones.
Clarification 10
This suggestion could be modified to specify a sliding-scale of indigenous composition percentages. After each successfully-completed presidential term, the composition of the regionalized army in each region could change from 80-20 (4% from each of the five non-indigenous regions), to 70-30 (6%), 60-40 (8%), until it is fixed permanently at 50-50 percent (10% from each non-indigenous region.)
No increased recruitment is needed: members of the security forces simply get re-assigned around the country as the compositions change. Thus for a 4-6 year presidential term (definitely no less than four years, no more than six years), parity within each region would be achieved in 16-24 years.
Note that a large percentage of the security forces indigenous to a region enhances the suitability of a largely barrack-less army. Recruitment centers would be spread NATIONWIDE.
Suggestion 11
50% of the budget must come from within the Region, 50% from the Central Federal Government Budget.
Clarification 11
Depending on the mix of Reserves and Standing Army, a Region may judiciously choose to use its 50% budget regional budget differently than another region. ALL BUDGETS FROM THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT MUST BE IDENTICAL.
Suggestion 12
The top army official of the South-Western Region will be called the "Head of the Army of the South-West Region of Nigeria", and will be answerable to the 2nd Vice-President, South-Western Region (who is also designated the Commander-In-Chief of the South-Western Regional Army of Nigeria, etc..) Ditto for the other regions.
Two top regional army deputies - one from the region, and another from a region that is not continguous to his zone of service - will be appointed. Thus, the South-Western Region Head
of Army would have a first deputy from the South-West and a second deputy from North-West, North-East, OR South-East Zones, while the South-South Zone would only be able to have a second-deputy from the North-West or North-East zones.
Clarification 12
In order to avoid confusion, these 2nd Vice-Presidents might be called "REGIONAL COMMANDERS" rather than "COMMANDER-IN-CHIEFS".
Suggestion 13
All the Regional Heads of Army will be of equal rank and will constitute an Army Council of Chiefs, with a rotational Chairman of Army Joint Chiefs of Staff answerable to the President. The Headquarters will be at Abuja.
Clarification 13
All Regional Heads of Army shall be called "Generals" even if they have to be promoted from low rank - Colonel, Lt. Colonel, etc. because of present structural deficiencies, eg. in the South-East Region. Upon completion of duty - if they have to - they will have to convert to two higher grades than their last one, but no higher than "Lt. General."
Note that the catapulting of rank has precedence in Nigeria (e.g. Musa Yar'Adua in the Obasanjo regime, while a temporary rank creation/reversion to old rank occurs in many armies in the world, especially during war situations.
Suggestion 14
There will be three Air Commands - Northern, Central and Southern (based in Kaduna, Jos and Lagos), and three Navy Commands - Western, Central and Eastern (based in Lagos, Lokoja, and Port Harcourt), answerable to President/Commander-in-Chief, but with Air and Navy Service Chiefs who, together with their deputies, must come from all the six political regions. The Air and Navy Commands would group states geographically rather than by regions.
Clarification 14
There is a concession to be made here. Rather than name towns such as Lagos, Lokoja, PH and Kaduna, the six command centers should be spread among the six regions in a manner best suited for each force.
Suggestion 15
three Air Command Chiefs and three Navy Command Chiefs will, together ith the Regional Heads of Army, form the JAFCON, with a Chairman chosen y and answerable to the President.
Clarication 15
No further clarification at this time.
Suggestion 16
Each Regional Army will send a detachment of no more than 500 to serve in the Brigade of Guards of the Federal Capital Territory (note: not "Presidential Guards"), the Head of which will be chosen solely by and answerable to the President. This Brigade of no more than 3,000 members of the Armed Forces will act as the first line of defence of the FCT against hostile attack.
Clarification 16
Note that this is not primarily for the protection of the President, but that of the capital. All elected officials should be guarded by the Police and Special Security forces of the Police.
Suggestion 17
If a Military Coup is attempted against Abuja either by one Region or by the Brigade of Guards, or within a Region, the other Regional Armies have the right to move in to quell the uprising. If the coup is sustained beyond six weeks, then the other regions have the right to secede temporarily, and permanently following a plebiscite approved by more than 67% of the voting population of the seceding region AND a majority of the REMAINING regions even after the uprising might have been quelled after six weeks.
Clarification 17
No further clarification at this time.
Suggestion 18
There shall be only State and Local Government Police, with clear jurisdiction and extradition rights and responsibilities. The numbers of such Police will be determined solely by the states and local governments.
Clarification 18
No further clarification at this time.
Suggestion 19
An increase in entry educational standards
The Nigerian armed forces and police should aim for a 40-60% university-degree-holders composition (ranks of the Standing Army and Reserves) within 10-15 years, and an approximately 20% female composition, with a clear plan to achieve same.
Clarification 19
While rumor has it that the general standards of education its officer corps has improved tremendously over the years, the same cannot be said for the ranks. Increasing the entry-level requirements along the lines suggested above would be desirable in order to eventually enable the armed forces to have several professional corps - Army Corp of Engineeers, Scientific Research Corps, Health Corps, Disaster Relief Corps, etc. - that can be useful in peace time and during National emergencies, and engage them away from the present predilection for coup-plotting.
Suggestion 20
Except as a member of a well-defined and approved military formation, no member of the Armed Forces or Police is allowed to wear his or her uniform outside the Army barracks. Any civil crime committed in uniform by any members of the Armed Forces or Police outside their barracks will be tried in civil court, and will incur a double fine or punishment for the first
fifteen years of institution of this rule, and normal fines thereafter.
Clarification 20
No further clarification at this time.
Suggestion 21
A justiciable Bill of Rights
A simple, justiciable Bill of Rights, pulled out from the Constitution, but written in as many Nigerian languages as possible, and distributed to all Nigerians and placed in key buildings and pasted on billboards and taught in schools, is recommended.
Clarification 21
A full Nigerian constitution is a daunting document, written in English legalese that the overwhelming number of Nigerians would find inscrutable. This proposed Bill of Rights would in simple terms spell out the inviolable rights (and responsibilities) of Nigerians, and WOULD LARGELY DEFINE WHAT IT REALLY MEANS TO BE A NIGERIAN. Public defenders would be funded to enforce rights of ordinary Nigerians violated under this justiciable Bill of Rights.
EPILOGUE
I am aware that the above proposals will generate a number of questions and comments and anxieties, and will require some revision before they become acceptable to a majority of people, Nigerians and non-Nigerians.
However, one must be prepared to make modifications as people raise questions, or make clarifications accordingly.
There is the practical concern about the radicality of the proposals and their prospects for enactment. Some of our compatriots have stated that Regionalization of the Army cannot happen, must not happen. The best answer is that given to General Al-Amin Daggash by one Okey Ifionu in a recent Post Express Article titled "Reasoning with General Daggash", from which I quote extensively:
"THE magisterial finality with which the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS),
Major-Gen. Al-Amin Daggash spoke last Tuesday on the issue of
restructuring the country's armed forces should worry every patriotic
Nigerian. Reacting to the widespread call for the army to be
regionalised, the CDS was reported to have said that "there can never
be regional armies in Nigeria, no matter the situation."
Granted that
the general was speaking ex-cathedral - that is, in his official
capacity - he nevertheless, by his statement, has granted himself the
powers of determining the collective preferences of the Nigerian
people. It does certainly smack of the age-old arrogance of the man in
uniform who believes that the khaki confers on him the power and
authority to make choices for the rest of Nigerians. General Daggash
was quoted in that same report to have expressed concern about the
consequences of regional armies, saying they will be 'grave'.
Earlier,
the defence headquarters had opposed such calls, describing them as
misguided. While these reactions from a Northern dominated armed
forces would hardly come as a surprise, it is necessary to examine the
substance of the said reactions. The first argument of people like
Daggash is that the army is a national institution, perhaps the only
'true' one still left and as such should not be balkanised into
regional units.
The other point often held up against demands for the
restructuring of the imbalances in the armed forces is that admission
into the institution is based on merit. Therefore if the army appears
to be dominated by persons from the North, it would, in effect, mean
that they attained that by merit. Logical as these two arguments may
appear, it is quite easy to take them apart within the context of
Nigeria's historical experience.......
However, just as the North feels
under-represented in the area of educational attainment and therefore
advocates the tempering of merit with quota, the south and the Igbo in
particular feel completely disadvantaged by the present composition and
command structure of the army.
Those who try to hush up any discussion
on the need and way and manner to restructure the armed forces are not
doing the nation much good. And it cannot be true that regional armies,
as some Northern elites are claiming, are a recipe for the
disintegration of the country. The real threat to the continued
existence of the nation is a hegemonistic army which is continuously
manipulated by the Northern elite to perpetuate their political
domination of the country.
So, Gen. Daggash must stop speaking in the
manner he did last Tuesday and understand that even a Chief of Defence
Staff has no right to say that "there can never be regional armies in
Nigeria, no matter the situation." Such language is not consistent with
the current efforts to find solutions to the serious problems facing
our twisted federal structure."
Finally, in this regard, I also give a quote attributed to one Sheldon Wolin, a political philosopher, who said that
"Democracy involves listening to a lot of discordant voices
and disparate interests and conflicting points of view... Democracy
really comes down to people trying to cooperate, to make common
decisions in context where there is great diversity and strong
conflict....the problem is not to come to the most rationally
justifiable decision...it's a problem of trying to come to a
decision in which there are conflicting legitimate claims."
CONCLUSION
I emphasize that the bottom line is that there must be democratization of regional military power in Nigeria, and a balance of power, authority and terror. At the same time, there must be assurance against capricious secessionist tendencies.
I commend the above proposals to your deliberations.
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