Introduction
I have been following, with interest, Dr. Nowa Omoigui's Nigerian-military-history-soaked "Weekend Musings". His latest one is simply titled: May 30, 1967 with a lead-in:
" The month of May 1967 in the affairs of Nigeria was as dynamic and turbulent as any other in our history. It moved with breath taking speed, crystallizing in its wake, the final common pathway of momentous developments that were to culminate in the declaration of Biafra on May 30. "
So Biafra was on Nowa's mind - and so I place it on mine too today, as I retrieve from my deep archives a fair-use serialization that I first provided back in October 1996 - March 1997. It was from General Alexander Madiebo's book "The Nigerian Revolution and the Biafran War", Fourth Dimension Publishers, Enugu (1980), 411 pages. Madiebo was Commander
Biafran Army.
At the end of the Madiebo excerpt, I have added some historical notes of my own, including additional excerpts from other sources:
- explanatory chapters from Madiebo's book itself other than the main Chapter 5;
- Awo's May 1, 1967 Ibadan speech (the so-called "East goes, West goes" declaration. The national question and resource
control aspects of this speech remain eerily relevant today.
- Enugu conversation between Awo (and his delegation) and Ojukwu (May 6, 1967);
- Ojukwu's Declaration of the Republic of Biafra speech (May 30)
Enjoy.
Bolaji Aluko
The Nigerian Revolution and the Biafran War
Major-General Alexander A. Madiebo, Rtd.
Commander Biafran Army
Fourth Dimension Publishers, Enugu (1980), 411 pages
179 Zik Avenue, PMB 1164, Enugu, Nigeria
CHAPTER 5
THE GATHERING STORM
The Final Plunge, (Page 92 ff)
The news that Colonel Ojukwu was in Aburi, Ghana, with other Military Governors on the 4th January, 1967 to try to find a peaceful solution to the current disturbances in the country came as an encouraging surprise to me and to many other senior military officers in the Eastern Region. At the end of the two-day conference some important decisions were reached, among which were:
- The immediate resumption of the Ad-Hoc Committee to work out the
constitutional future of Nigeria.
- The payment of salaries until 31st of March, 1967 of all staff and employees of Government and Statutory Corporations and any others who were forced to leave their posts as a result of the disturbances.
- The setting up, in the meantime, of a committee to look into the problem of rehabilitation of displaced persons and the recovery of their property.
- The exclusion of the use of force as a means of stettling any difference within the country.
- The repealing of all decrees which tended to overcentralise power at the expense of Regional autonomy. This would be followed by the enactment of a decree before the 21st of January, to restore the Regions to their political position prior to January 15, 1966.
On the advice of some Federal senior civil servants, most of whom were acting on foreign advice, Gowon rejected most of these decision, particularly those pertaining to the payment of displaced persons and the reconvening of the Ad Hoc Constitutional Conference. As a follow-up, Gowon enacted Decree no. 8 which gave him power to declare a state of
emergency in any Region irrespective of the wishes of the Governor of that Region. Later Gowon published these as the official outcome of the Aburi conference. The above measures were a clear indication that Gowon was no longer giving much consideration to the possibility of a peaceful solution. Rather he was preparing the ground for the use of force.
The Eastern Nigerian Government, then absolutely helpless, passed a couple of Edicts to protect the interests of its people and avoid a total economic collapse of the Region. These Edicts were meant to serve as temporary relief while a more permanent solution was being sought. Foremost among these Edicts were the Registration of Companies Edict, the
Revenue Collection Edict and the Court of Appeal Edict. As a punishment for these measures taken by the Eastern Nigeria Government, the Lagos Government imposed economic sanctions on the Eastern Region.
As a result of the deteriorating situation, Colonel Ojukwu convened a meeting of the Advisory Committee of Chiefs and Elders at Enugu, on the 26th of May, 1967, to acquaint them with the latest developments and seek their decision.
He gave the commitee alternative solutions to the crises:
- To accept the terms of the North and Gowon and thereby submit to
domination by the North; or
- To continue the present stalemate and drift; or
- Ensure the survival of the people by asserting their autonomy.
On the 27th of May, the Consultative Assembly mandated Colonel Ojukwu "to
declare, at the earliest practicable date, Eastern Nigeria a free
sovereign and independent state by the name and title of the Republic of
Biafra." Lagos' reaction to this was swift and immediate for Gowon at
once announced a new constitution for Nigeria based upon the division of
the existing four Regions into twelve States. By the arrangement, the
Eastern Region was unilaterally split into three States: Rivers, East
Central and South Eastern States [SEE NOTE 1].
Completely engulfed in an apparently misguided optimism, we perhaps spent
by far too much time and money on propaganda with little left for military
preparations. When the Head of State of Biafra told the nation that no
country in black Africa could defeat by land, air or sea, the nation went
wild with joy and thought that any further delay on our part in launching
an attack against Nigeria was senseless. Yet the Commanders of the Army,
Navy and the Air Force had not been told where the forces referred to were
stationed [SEE NOTE 2]. Even the announcement by the Head of State that if
we were attacked the grass would fight for us, was taken literally by
many, who were beginning to ask for nothing but war. In an attempt to
demonstrate the strength of the Biafran Army, Colonel Ojukwu took some top
civilians to the firing range of the First Battalion at Enugu. There,
some newly acquired machine guns and automatic rifles were displayed and
later fired. The noise produced was impressive and sufficiently
indicative of strength. When Chief Awolowo visited Enugu, just before the
outbreak of war, two helicopters painted in Army colorus, put up a short
demonstration for him to illustrate our air power. When the helicopters
finally landed on the grounds of the State House, and the fierce-looking
pilots jumped out smartly, it was clear that the chief from Yorubaland was
highly impressed. [SEE NOTE 3]
With the people's minds thus prepared for war, demonstrations were
organised and held all over the country demanding immediate action against
Nigeria. Everywhere the cry on everybody's lips was "Ojukwu Nyeanyi Egbe"
(Ojukwu give us weapons.) Finally, on the 30th May, 1967, the Head of
State declared Eastern Nigeria an independent and sovereign state of
Biafra. [SEE NOTE 4] In doing this, he was merely acting in accordance
with the mandate given to him earlier by the people. The mandate had
authorised him to do so "at the earliest practicable date." Almost all
senior army officers thought the answer to that question was an
unqualified "No." The thought of being independent of Nigeria was simply
glorious but to make this is a reality was going to be a miracle; yet
there was universal jubilation.
By June, expatriates began to leave Biafra because of mounting pressures
to do so from both the Lagos Government and their respective embassies. I
remember some American staff, at the University of Nigeria, paid me a
visit at my Nsukka Headquarters, on 4th July, 1967 to seek advice on the
question of leaving Biafra. They disclosed that they had been told by
Lagos to leave Nsukka immediately for Gowon's Army would go through that
town on 6th July, 1967. While admitting the fact that the situation was
very critical, I explained to them that Gowon's march through Nsukka, if
it took place, would be resisted, and certainly long enough to allow them
to pack up and leave the town or even the country. I however pointed out
that the choice to remain in or leave Biafra rested entirely on them in
the final analysis. I think they stayed on till the outbreak of the war
when I also realised the significance of the date they had mentioned. [SEE
NOTE 5]
Later on that day, Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, also at Nsukka, called me to seek
advice. He pointed out that, if all stories he had heard were to be true,
and if all outstanding threats from Lagos were to be executed, Nsukka
would be unsafe for civilians pretty soon. He was therefore contemplating
a move from Nsukka after he should have heard from me. My advice was that
a move before the outbreak of hostilities would be premature as the
direction of the initial invasion was not known.
End of Madiebo Excerpt
Mobolaji Aluko Notes on Madiebo Excerpt
NOTE 1
Rapid Activities on Both Sides
Nigeria was existing as a federation of three regions (Northern, Western
and Eastern Regions) on the day of the first coup, January 15, 1966. On
May 24, 1966, General Aguiyi-Ironsi abolished the regions by decree
[Federal Government Decree no. 34 (Unification Decree)], replacing the
Federal structure with a unitary government. He was assasinated in a
counter-coup in July 1966 while touring the nation, [See Note 1a below]
with Gowon becoming the new Head of State soon thereafter.
Following the Eastern Region Consultative Assembly meeting in Enugu
mandating Biafra's secessionist action, on the very same day, May 27,
1967, Gowon issued a decree, dividing Nigeria into twelve states:
North: North-Western, North-Central, Kano, North-Eastern,
Benue-Plateau, Kwara
West: Lagos, Western
Midwest: Midwestern
East: East-Central, Rivers, South-Eastern
By June 3, Gowon appointed eleven civilians to the Federal Executive
Council, making Chief Obafemi Awolowo the Vice-Chairman and Federal
Minister of Finance. Others included Chief Anthony Enahoro (Information),
J.S Tarka, Alhaji Aminu Kano, and Wenike Briggs . The full Council
included members from each of the twelve new states. Ukpabi Asika, Social
Science lecturer at the University of Ibadan, became Administrator of East
Central State in October 1967, after the fall of Enugu. Ken Saro-Wiwa,
lecturer in English at the University of Lagos, at age 26 was appointed
the Administrator of Bonny (Island) on November 11, 1967, while his father
was still in Umuahia, Biafra (till the tail end of the war.) Three months
later, Saro-Wiwa began working in Bonny very closely with then Colonel
(now retired General) Akinrinade till September 1968 [See Note 1b].
Note 1a: MADIEBO, page 56 ff:
"Even at that late and very dark hour, while the North was putting
finishing touches to their [COUP] plan, Ironsi was still confident he
would reverse the ugly situation. He hoped to do this by touring all
Regions of Nigeria to explain to their leaders the merits and good
intentions of Decree no. 34 and to reassure them generally. All
Southern leaders - army and police officers, politicians, intellectuals
and others - who could reach Ironsi advised him against undertaking
such a tour but he was determined to go ahead with it.
Ironsi first visited the North, and there it was an arduous effort to
restrain young Northern Nigerian officers from seizing advantage of his
visit to commence their coup. What actually happened was that the more
mature Northerners and their advisers did not want Ironsi killed in the
North. Neither did they want to risk a confrontation with him in Lagos
where all major units were being commanded by Ibos, with whose help he
could easily foil the coup before it gained momentum. Midwestern
Nigeria was unsuitable for such an operation because no troops were
stationed there and a sudden movement of troops towards the Region
would have alerted him. It was clear that Western Region was going to
be the battleground for it satisfied all the necessary requirements.
The only battalion in Western Nigeria was under the command
of a Northerner, Colonel Joe Akahan, and the men on the exercise would be
dealing with an indifferent population.
That Ironsi himself realised the dangers he faced was doubtful,
but he was advised by all who knew the true situation to halt his tour
and remain in Lagos for awhile. However, he was determined to continue
his tour.
When he came back from Northern Nigeria, he left for Midwestern
Nigeria on the 27th of July and, as expected, never returned.............
Page 62 ff
[Captain Dilibe, an Ibo Staff Officer at the First Brigade
Headquarters....] revealed that Ironsi had telephoned the Brigade
Headquarters from Ibadan at 0730 hours [ON THE 29th JULY] to say that
the Government House where he was staying was surrounded by
soldiers. Ironsi also informed the Brigade that he had already made
several attempts to get a helicopter sent to him from Lagos but had
failed......................
Page 85 ff
Ironsi's Air Force ADC, Captain Nwankwo, who was with Ironsi at the
time of his death, later told ust the story in Enugu of how the General
died. According to Nwankwo, at 0630 hours on the 29th of July 1966,
Ironsi, Fajuyi, the Governor of Western Nigeria and himself were
arrested at Government House, Ibadan by Northern troops under the
command of Captain Danjuma. Colonel Hilary Njoku, who was also
present, escaped with multiple bullet wounds. The troops used to
affect the arrestw were those detailed to protect the General during
his tour. The captives were driven to an isolated jungle just
outside Ibadan. By the time they got there, the prisoners had been
so thoroughly beaten that the older two - Ironsi and Fajuyi - could
hardly stand up. Shortly after, Fajuyi was shot, then Ironsi.
While Ironsi was being shot, Nwankwo said he ran into the bush and
escaped. He emphasized that his escape was not due to his
cleverness, but because his colleague, the Hausa ADC who was also
present, wanted him to escape.
Nwankwo explained that during the month of June, 1966, he and his
Northern colleague had discussed the possibility of another coup.
The Northern officer was emphatic the Ibos were going to do it
again, but Nwankwo swore it was going to be done by Northerners.
According to him, at the end of a long but heated argument, they came
to an agreement that whichever side did it, the man on the winning
side should save the other's life. Based on this agreement,
the Northern ADC whispered t Nwankwo to escape while Ironsi was being
shot, and also discouraged the soldiers from chasing after him. Nwankwo
said he later made his way to Lagos and contacted this Northern
officer again, who not only hid him for a couple of days, but
eventually took him out of Lagos in the boot of a car.
Note 1b: Saro-Wiwa and Akinrinnade
To learn about the deep admiration for Akinrinnade by Saro-Wiwa, read his
"On a Darkling Plain: An Account of the Nigerian Civil War."
NOTE 2
Ojukwu's Top Military Echelon
Although somewhat anachronistic, this note is to put on record a note to
be found below a picture on Page 323 of Madiebo's book:
"Biafran top commanders at Isu watching a parade to mark the 2nd
Anniversary of Biafra's independence in 1969. Standing left to right:
Colonel E. Udeaja (parade commander), WIng Commander W. Ezeilo (Air Force
Commander), Colonel S. Ogunewe (Military Aid to Head of State), Major
General P. Efiong (Chief of Defence Staff), General C. Ojukwu (Head of
State), Major General A. Madiebo (Commander Biafran Army), Mr. P. Okeke
(Inspector General of Police), Caption F. Anuku (Navy Commander). "
NOTE 3
The Awo Delegation Trip to Enugu
Page 94 is the last page in Madiebo's 411-page book in which "the chief
from Yorubaland", Obafemi Awolowo, is mentioned. Chief Awolowo had this
opportunity to be "highly impressed", because at or around May 5 - 9,
1967, he was the head of a four-man National Conciliation Committee
delegation.
Page 78 of Saro-Wiwa: " On a Darkling Plain: An Account of the Nigerian
Civil War":
"The professional criers, as might be expected, were also hard at work
bemoaning the suspected demise of the Federation. They sent a delegation
to Enugu to make peace proposals. The composition of the delegation
was quite interesting: Chief Awolowo, Leader of the Yorubas; a Yoruba
economist, Dr. Aluko, who was given to writing "intellectual" articles
and virulent criticisms of Government and had served for a stormy while
at the University of Nigeria, and two other dignitaries from the
Mid-Western Region [CHIEF JERETON MARIERE AND CHIEF J.I.G. ONYIA], one
of them having Ibo sympathies..............
An excerpt from my Naijanet archives of June 19, 1995 details a record
of the conversation between Ojukwu and Awolowo during this historic
meeting:
BEQIN POSTING:
AWO-OJUKWU ENUGU CONVERSATION
I have excerpted below an unpublished response (by one Mr. Lanre Banjo)
to an article titled "Igbo Leaders Vow Never to Fight for Yorubas, Fear
Another Betrayal" in a March issue of "The Nigerian Times" published by
Dr. Chika A. Onyeani of New York. My focus here is not on the views of
the excerptor (Banjo) but on the recorded conversation between Awo and
Ojukwu. This excerpt obviously can not be all of their conversation, but
the authenticity and information that this short piece provides is there
for us to judge.
------------------------- Begin Excerpt ------------------------
........[STUFF DELETED]......
... Here is the true account of what took place as taken from scripts
of the discussion between Papa and Chief Ojukwu (the Ikemba). The
discussion was taped by the Ikemba and the recorder was captured after
Enugu fell.
On Saturday, May 6, 1967, at 5.15 pm, a meeting began to take place,
at the State House, Enugu, between the then Excellency, Lt. Col.
Odumegwu Ojukwu (the Ikemba) and a delegation of the National
Conciliation Committee (Committee) led by the most Honorable Chief
Obafemi Awolowo. The Committee was represented by Professor Samuel
Aluko, Chief Mariere, Chief J.I. Onyia, while the Eastern Region was
represented by Lt. Col Imo, Lt. Col Effiong, Lt. Col. Kurubo, Mr. C.O
Mojekwu, Mr. N.U. Akpan, Professor Eni Njoku, Dr. Nwakanma Okoro,
Dr. P.N.C. Okigbo, Mr. C.A. Onyegbale and Mr. Ndem with the Ikemba
presiding over the meeting. The names are listed for the purpose
of verification of facts presented herein below with those of them who
may still be alive..............
Papa: The main concern of these delegates is to ensure that Nigeria
does not disintegrate, and I would like to see Nigeria bound
together by any bond because it is better than breaking the
whole place up because each unit will be the loser for it.
The economy of the country is so integrated that it is too late
in the day to try and sever them without risking the death of
one or both of them. So we have come, therefore, to appeal
to you to let Eastern representatives attend the meeting of
the Committee (ON-GOING NATIONAL CONCILIATION MEETING)
I do not want to put myself in a position where I will be treated
as an advocate of the Eastern cause. Let the Eastern delegates
go there, make their case and then as a member of the Committee
I will get up and say I support this entirely. If at the meeting
the East and West present what they want for a new Nigeria
whether temporarily or permanently, and the North says "no,
we are not going to have it", I will go out and address a
World Press Conference and send our case to that body and say
this is what we have done and the North has turned it down.
I will then take any step that is necessary to bring into effect
what we want. The North needed to be in a position of being
presented with the United front of the South.
Ikemba: I started off this struggle in July with 120 rifles to defend
the entirety of the East. I took my stand knowing fully well
that by doing so, whilst carving my name in history, I was
signing also my death warrant. But I took it because I believe
that this stand is vital to the survival of the South. I
appealed for settlement quietly because I understood that
this was a naked struggle for power and that the only time
we can sit down and decide the future of Nigeria on basis
of equality will always be equality of arms. Quietly, I
built up. If you do not know it, I am proud, and my officers
are proud, that here in the East we possess the biggest
army in Black Africa. I am no longer speaking as an underdog,
I am speaking from a position of power. [SEE NOTE 3a] The only
way for the
South to present a united front is for the South to meet and
hammer out that united front. It is a point which must be
cleared first before proceeding to make a statement of whatever
it is. That is why to my mind, at the present stage of the
crisis the ideal thing is for the Southern people to meet
in any platform and discuss and hammer out any difference
they might have because I will have nothing to do with the North.
Then going further, it would then mean that to do this the South
to meet; because if we wait for their permission, we will
wait for ever. On the specific question of whether there is
a possibility of contract with the North, the answer is at the
battle field.
Papa: I do appreciate the points you have made, especially the suggestion
the South could take the bull by the horns, convene a meeting
of its leaders and work out its salvation. Well, I must say
that a number of factors have been overlooked in this regard.
I would be quite willing to attend any meeting convened by the
leaders of the South in the South, but it must be realized
that we in the West are in a very difficult position. All the
members of the bodyguard of the Military Governor of the Western
Region were Northerners; there were over 36,000 soldiers in
the whole of the West, most of whom were Northerners, and all of
them carry arms..... I led a delegation to Lt. Col. Gowon on the
7th and at that interview I made it clear on behalf of the West
that if the soldiers of Northern origin were not removed from
the West we would not attend any further meetings of the Ad Hoc
Committee. He said he would do something, of course he did not.
We passed our resolution (THAT THE NORTHERN SOLDIERS SHOULD BE
REMOVED FROM THE WEST) and Col. Adebayo did very well and give
us certain Yoruba officers with whom to go and deliver the
petition to Lt. Col. Gowon. I did give him an ultimatum up
to the 15th of May to remove these Northern soldiers from the
West. Of course, he agreed to remove them by the 31st of May
but the time we returned to Ibadan Northern soldiers had taken
up arms and wanted to kill me, to kill Adebayo and all others.
Just now Adebayo does not sleep in his house. Somebody told
me that he has not been sleeping in his house. I know why they
put two policemen with two rifles in front of my house the other
day. Of course, I rang up and said I wanted them removed. There
were policemen in front of Sardauna's house but they did not save
him. The populace, of course, turned against the Northern
soldiers. I don't know why Adebayo should issue the release
that soldiers should not be taunted. But this is the way we
have been doing our quiet fighting. You are remote from the
West; you have advantages which we do not possess. We cannot
rush without rushing to our death at the same time. We are not
cowards in the West but we have to move cautiously, because if
we do not do that you might not have us alive; you would only
have monuments all over the place.
And I may say in this connection of Southern solidarity -- I am
sorry to go into what has happened in the past -- in 1953 there
was an understanding between the banned NCNC and the banned
Action Group; we entered into an agreement, which I hope we will
use sometime, to the effect that if the North remained intransigent
we would declare a Southern Dominion. This was signed by myself
and Zik and I still stand by it; but we prefer that you should
send your delegates to this meeting, so that we should, known
to everyone, enter into negotiations among ourselves and present
a common front to the North. Then nobody can accuse us of
conspiracy or trying to divide the country into two parts. I
want you to look at it from our point of view. If there were
no Northern soldiers in the West the position would be different.
And even if by the time I return home the Northern soldiers have
gone I still do not want to be accused of perfidy. The issue
at hand is not enough for us to say that we do not like the North.
That is a negative approach. I think a positive approach will
be for us to meet. Unity will last only if it is based on common
understanding among us and the basis will start at this meeting.
As I said before, I want you to give me a chance of meeting
your people regularly. Let us reolve our differences and
get what we want and quickly too.
Ikemba: If the reason is to get a platform for a meeting between the
Southern leaders, I agree very much that we should try and find
a platform and here we seem to be presented with a fait accompli.
The Southern leaders are here now, so the main thing is to go
on and discuss.
Papa: It will be something near fraud for us to sit down here and
discuss in terms of the South especially as this delegation was
sent here by a body consisting of the Northern delegation....
Ikemba: Now coming to the wider question of the East attending, if it
is a Reconciliation COmmittee then it must be reconciling warring
parties. A Reconciliation Committee can not have the parties
within, somehow, it does not work, unless, of course, they have
already agreed on the major issues, because reconciliation
is to stay in the middle of the warring parties. And one thing
is so clear in the Nigerian situation: certainly the North
and the East are warring. For any Reconciliation Committee to
do justice to the East, it should not have Easterners and
Northerners
in it. That is one point. How does the Reconciliation Committee
expect us to go to Lagos ? Can you, Sir, imagine Sir Kashim
Ibrahim coming to the East to meet and discuss ? The critical
point of the Eastern stand is that the East cannot go to any place
where there are Northern troops. That tells his own story.
The North has made it abundantly clear that no association
if they are not controlling the central machinery, is acceptable
to them. Even in the face of the resolutions of the South,
the Emirs, feudalist Emirs, had the audacity to dictate to the
South; first that they will not allow the Northern troops to leave
the West until they are satisfied that the West has got sufficient
troops.
Papa: You have talked about Easterners and Northerners trying to go to
the same meeting and bringing about reconciliation because they
are the two warring parties. I do not think the fight is between
the East and the North alone. It affects all other parts of the
country save that there is no quarrel between the East and the
West and Mid-West. The fight involves all of us. The West
at this moment, has its own complaints against the North. The fact
that we went there particularly so soon after my withdrawal
from the Ad Hoc Constitutional Committee, which I observed was
set up by the Federal Government to wage war against the East
instead of trying to put things in check, must assure you that
we are resolved to find a solution to this.
You have also spoken about Lagos or anywhere in the West as
unsafe for the Easterners to hold a meeting. Nobody can
tell when life will be lost, but I think, speaking the minds of
entire people of Western Nigeria and Mid-Western Nigeria, that if
anybody can at this stage take the life of an Ibo man or an
Easterner, or if any outstanding Eastern loses his life by the
act of someone else, the whole of the Western Region and the
Mid-Western Region will take it as the end of Nigeria. I
can give that assurance on behalf of Western Nigeria and Lagos."
[End of all the Awo-Ojukwu quotations in the excerpt - Mr. Lanre's
Banjo continues:]
This meeting was concluded on Sunday, 7th of May at about 2.15 pm with the
hope to reconvene and with the Ikemba maintaining that the South must
first meet. Before I go further, it would be noted that the Ikemba's view
was maintained due to hindsight (sic: LACK OF FORESIGHT). First, Papa
has just been released from prison for a charge of treasonable felony.
Secondly, he was in Enugu representing the Nigerian National Conciliation
Committee. How could Ikemba expect him to chage and focus on Southern
plan of pulling out of Nigeria ? Papa was more principled than that.
Even prior to his meeting with the Ikemba, he had been falsely accused
of having teamed up with the Ikemba in his campaign against the Federal
Military Government by being in regular touch with him by phone calls
and personal visits to Enugu, to perfect their joint plans. That he had
been sending Professor Aluko and others to Enugu for illegal guerrilla
training. Given this situation, a sudden change to discuss how the South
will unite against the North will definitely confirm the dreadful
and blatant accusations already levelled against him.............
[STUFF DELETED]
------------------------ End of Excerpt ---------------------------------
END OF MY JUNE 19, 1995 POSTING
Now, Back to Page 78 of Saro-Wiwa:
"It cannot be believed that the [AWOLOWO'S ENUGU] delegation was
expected to achieve much.
They probably obtained certain promiese from Ojukwu, for they returned
to Lagos with proposals which were said to have been agreed by Ojukwu.
The Federal Government was to lift the economic blockade placed on
the Eastern Region in some respects, a gesture which Ojukwu would
reciprocate by abrogating some of the laws he had passed confiscating
certain properties and assets of the Federal Government.
Gowon, acting in good faith, immediately accepted the proposals and
began to implement them. But Ojukwu had no intention of accepting
any proposals whatsoever, except that which was by now uppermost
in his mind: secession. He was considerably encouraged by a statement
made by Chief Awolowo [IN IBADAN ON MAY 1, 1967] which has remained
controversial ever since. Chief Awolowo had said that "If the Eastern
Region is allowed by acts of omission or commission to secede from or
opt ouf of Nigeria, then the Western Region and Lagos must also stay out
of the Federation."
The Ibo leadership immediately interpreted Awolowo's statement to
mean that if Eastern Nigeria seceded, the West would follow suit.
They may have been encouraged in that interpretation as much by the
erratic parts of Awolowo's speech [SEE NOTE 6] wherein he called for a
peaceful solution to the problem and trenchantly opposed any war
against the rest by the "North", as by the fact that only a short
while before, the Yoruba West had called for the removal of
"northern" troops from the Western Region. The Government of the
West had subsequently banned the "Morning Post", as Ojukwu had done
earlier. The Federal Government had not been able
to make its authority felt in either of these cases. Indeed, by the
end of the month, it had accepted publicly to withdraw non-Yoruba
troops from the West."
Note 3a An addition in Saro-Wiwa's book
In Saro-Wiwa's "On A Darkling Plain.." version of this same portion
of the conversation, an addition at this very point is:
"It is not my intention to unleash the destruction which my army can
unleash. It is not my intention to fight until I am attacked. If I am
attacked, I will take good care of the aggressor."
NOTE 4
Ojukwu's Declaration of Biafra's Secession
Page 193 ff Ojukwu: "Biafra: Selected Speeches with Journals of Events",
(1969)
"Fellow countrymen and women, YOU, the people of Eastern Nigeria:
CONSCIOUS of the supreme authority of Almight God over all manking, of
your duty to yourselves and posterity;
AWARE that you can no longer be protecte in your lives and in your
property by any government based outside Eastern Nigeria;
BELIEVING that you are born free and have certain inalienable rights
which be best preserved by yourselves;
UNWILLING to be unfree partners in any association of a political or
economic nature;
REJECTING the authority of any person or persons other than the Military
Government of Eastern Nigeria to make any imposition of whatever kind or
nature upon you;
DETERMINED to dissolve all political and other ties between you and the
former Federal Republic of Nigeria;
PREPARED to enter into such associtaion, treaty or alliance with any
sovereign state within the former Federal Republic of Nigeria and
elsewhere on such terms and condition as best to subserve your common
good;
AFFIRMING your trust and confidence in ME;
HAVING mandate ME to proclaim on your behalf, in your name, that Eastern
Nigeria be a sovereign independent Republic, NOW THEREFORE I, LIEUTENANT
COLONEL CHUKWUEMEKA ODUMEGWU OJUKWU, MILITARY GOVERNOR OF EASTERN
NIGERIA, BY VIRTUE OF THE AUTHORITY, AND PURSUANT TO THE PRINCIPLES,
RECITED ABOVE, DO HEREBY SOLEMNLY PROCLAIM THAT THE TERRITORY AND
REGION KNOWN AS AND CALLED EASTERN NIGERIA TOGETHER WITH HER
CONTINENTAL SHELF AND TERRITORIAL WATERS SHALL HENCEFORTH BE
AN INDEPENDENT SOVEREIGN STATE OF THE NAME AND TITLE OF "THE REPUBLIC
OF BIAFRA." AND I DO DECLARE THAT:
(i)all political ties between us and the Federal Republic of
Nigeria are hereby totally dissolved;
(ii)all subsisting contractual obligations entered into by the
Government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria or by any person,
authority, organization, or government acting on its behalf,
with any person, authority, or organisation, or relating to
any matter or thing, within the Republic of Biafra, shall
henceforth be deemed to be entered into with the Military
Governor of the Republic of Biafra for and on behalf
of the Government and people of the Republic of Biafra, and the
covenants thereof shall, subject to this Declaration, be
performed by the parties according to their tenor............
(x) it is our intention to remain a member of the British Commonwealth
of Nations in our right as a sovereign independent nation.
LONG LIVE THE REPUBLIC OF BIAFRA!
AND MAY GOD PROTECT ALL WHO LIVE IN HER. "
NOTE 5
A Personal Anecdote
I cannot resist a personal anecdote here, because my family was one of
those who sought advice and had to evacuate from the University of
Nigeria, Nsukka. From my deep archives here on Naijanet, on August 11,
1994, in response to a very provocative piece by Dr. Sola Adeyeye, I had
written, inter alia:
"...First, my father, Prof. Sam Aluko, was an activist economist staunchly
in Awolowo's camp during all of this struggle, one of the young
intellectual "Turks" (including Oluwasanmi) that Awolowo so much enjoyed
their company. He (along with several others) was one of the very first
university professors ever dismissed for political reasons in Nigeria, by
Chief Akintola (in 1963/64) during the problems preceding the Western
Region debacle. He was tried and sentenced for sedition, and upon refusing
to pay the fine, received "forced" contributions from those present at the
courthouse, otherwise he would have been hauled into jail ! It was his
dismissal that forced him to go to take up appointment (and become Head of
Dept. of Econs.) at the University of Nigeria, Nsukka in 1964 (notice: he
could not have gone to NSUKKA in 1964, three years BEFORE THE SECESSION if
there was so much hate between Igbos and Yorubas !). This move threw him
into the thick of Eastern Region politics - he toured Aba, Onitsha,
Arochukwu, Calabar, Ikot-Ekpene, Port Harcourt, all on behalf of the
Action Group. I remember distinctly going with him to the broadcasting
station in Enugu several times during the rigged elections in the Western
Region, from where the Action Group announced its own "cooked " versions
of the results for good measure !. I remember distinctly Wole Soyinka
bursting into our home one night in Nsukka unannounced when he was being
sought in the Western Region for attempting to assasinate Chief Akintola
at the Ibadan TV Station.
On the eve of the secession, my father led a long caravan of students and
faculty group of non-Igbos away from Nsukka, meeting others at Onitsha,
despite entreaties from Ojukwu not to leave; Ojukwu was and remains a
personal friend of his. He was however to return to Enugu as one of four
eminent persons sent by Gowon (delegation led by Chief Awolowo) to
persuade Ojukwu not to lead Biafra to secede, at which point Ojukwu
disclosed that the momentum to secede was too far to stop the effort, that
in fact his life would be in danger if he broached a retreat, but that he
believed that the secession would be short-lived, and he would do
everything in his power to make it so. Of course, history proved him
wrong, but these are some truths (if you will permit me to be so blunt)
that never come out in conversations..........."
NOTE 6
Speech by Chief Obafemi Awolowo made to the Western leaders of thought, in
Ibadan, 1 May 1967. (Culled from Daily Times, 2 May 1967) and quoted in
"Crisis and Conflict in Nigeria (Volume 1), January 1966-July 1971" by A.
H. M. Kirk-Greene.
Awolowo Promises West will secede if the East does
The aim of a leader should be the welfare of the people whom he leads. I
have used 'welfare' to denote the physical, mental and spiritual
well-being of the people. With this aim fixed unflinchingly and
unchangeably before my eyes I consider it my duty to Yoruba people in
particular and to Nigerians in general, to place four imperatives before
you this morning. Two of them are categorical and two are conditional.
Only a peaceful solution must be found to arrest the present worsening
stalemate and restore normalcy. The Eastern Region must be encouraged to
remain part of the Federation. If the Eastern Region is allowed by acts
of omission or commission to secede from or opt out of Nigeria, then the
Western Region and Lagos must also stay out of the Federation. The people
of Western Nigeria and Lagos should participate in the ad hoc committee or
any similar body only on the basis of absolute equality with the other
regions of the Federation.
I would like to comment briefly on these four imperatives. There
has, of late, been a good deal of sabre rattling in some parts of the
country. Those who advocate the use force for the settlement of our
present problems should stop a little and reflect. I can see no vital and
abiding principle involved in any war between the North and the East. If
the East attacked the North, it would be for purpose of revenge pure and
simple. Any claim to the contrary would be untenable. If it is claimed
that such a war is being waged for the purpose of recovering the real and
personal properties left behind in the North by Easterners two insuperable
points are obvious. Firstly, the personal effects left behind by
Easterners have been wholly looted or destroyed, and can no longer be
physically recovered. Secondly, since the real properties are immovable in
case of recovery of them can only be by means of forcible military
occupation of those parts of the North in which these properties are
situated. On the other hand, if the North attacked the East, it could only
be for the purpose of further strengthening and entrenching its position
of dominance in the country.
If it is claimed that an attack on the East is going to be
launched by the Federal Government and not by the North as such and that
it is designed to ensure the unity and integrity of the Federation, two
other insuperable points also become obvious. First, if a war against the
East becomes a necessity it must be agreed to unanimously by the remaining
units of the Federation. In this connection, the West, Mid- West and Lagos
have declared their implacable opposition to the use of force in solving
the present problem. In the face of such declarations by three out of
remaining four territories of Nigeria, a war against the East could only
be a war favoured by the North alone. Second, if the true purpose of such
a war is to preserve the unity and integrity of the Federation, then these
ends can be achieved by the very simple devices of implementing the
recommendation of the committee which met on August 9 1966, as reaffirmed
by a decision of the military leaders at Aburi on January 5 1967 as well
as by accepting such of the demands of the East, West, Mid-West and Lagos
as are manifestly reasonable, and essential for assuring harmonious
relationships and peaceful co--existence between them and their brothers
and sisters in the North.
Some knowledgeable persons have likened an attack on the East to
Lincoln's war against the southern states in America. Two vital factors
distinguish Lincoln's campaign from the one now being contemplated in
Nigeria. The first is that the American civil war was aimed at the
abolition of slavery - that is the liberation of millions of Negroes who
were then still being used as chattels and worse than domestic animals.
The second factor is that Lincoln and others in the northern states were
English-speaking people waging a war of good conscience and humanity
against their fellow nationals who were also English speaking. A war
against the East in which Northern soldiers are predominant, will only
unite the Easterners or the Ibos against their attackers, strengthen them
in their belief that they are not wanted by the majority of their
fellow-Nigerians, and finally push them out of the Federation.
We have been told that an act of secession on the part of the East
would be a signal, in the first instance, for the creation of the COR
state by decree, which would be backed, if need be, by the use of force.
With great respect, I have some dissenting observations to make on this
declaration. There are 11 national or linguistic groups in the COR areas
with a total population of 5.3 millions. These national groups are as
distinct from one another as the Ibos are distinct from them or from the
Yorubas or Hausas. Of the 11, the Efik/Ibibio/Annang national group are
3.2 million strong as against the Ijaws who are only about 700,000 strong.
Ostensibly, the remaining nine national group number 1.4 millions. But
when you have subtracted the Ibo inhabitants from among them, what is left
ranges from the Ngennis who number only 8,000 to the Ogonis who are
220,000 strong. A decree creating a COR state without a plebiscite to
ascertain the wishes of the peoples in the area, would only amount to
subordinating the minority national groups in the state to the dominance
of the Efik/Ibibio/Annang national group. It would be perfectly in order
to create a Calabar state or a Rivers state by decree, and without a
plebiscite. Each is a homogeneous national unit. But before you lump
distinct and diverse national units together in one state, the consent of
each of them is indispensable. Otherwise, the seed of social disquilibrium
in the new state would have been sown.
On the other hand, if the COR State is created by decree after the
Eastern Region shall have made its severance from Nigeria effective, we
should then be waging an unjust war against a foreign state. It would be
an unjust war, because the purpose of it would be to remove 10 minorities
in the East from the dominance of the Ibos only to subordinate them to the
dominance of the Efik/Ibibio/Annang national group. I think I have said
enough to demonstrate that any war against the East, or vice versa, on any
count whatsoever, would be an unholy crusade, for which it would be most
unjustifiable to shed a drop of Nigerian blood. Therefore, only a peaceful
solution must be found, and quickly too to arrest the present rapidly
deteriorating stalemate and restore normalcy.
With regard to the second categorical imperative, it is my
considered view that whilst some of the demands of the East are excessive
within the context of a Nigerian union, most of such demands are not only
wellfounded, but are designed for smooth and steady association amongst
the various national units of Nigeria.
The dependence of the Federal Government on financial
contributions from the regions? These and other such like demands I do not
support. Demands such as these, if accepted, will lead surely to the
complete disintegration of the Federation which is not in the interest of
our people. But I wholeheartedly support the following demands among
others, which we consider reasonable and most of which are already
embodied in our memoranda to the Ad Hoc Committee....
That revenue should be allocated strictly on the basis of
derivation; that is to say after the Federal Government has deducted its
own share for its own services the rest should be allocated to the regions
to which they are attributable.
That the existing public debt of the Federation should become the
responsibility of the regions on the basis of the location of the projects
in respect of each debt whether internal or external.
That each region should have and control its own
militia and police force.
That, with immediate effect, all military personnel should be
posted to their regions of origin....
If we are to live in harmony one with another as Nigerians it is
imperative that these demands and others which are not related, should be
met without further delay by those who have hitherto resisted them. To
those who may argue that the acceptance of these demands will amount to
transforming Nigeria into a federation with a weak central government, my
comment is that any link however tenuous, which keeps the East in the
Nigerian union, is better in my view than no link at all.
Before the Western delegates went to Lagos to attend the meetings
of the ad hoc committee, they were given a clear mandate that if any
region should opt out of the Federation of Nigeria, then the Federation
should be considered to be at an end, and that the Western Region and
Lagos should also opt out of it. It would then be up to Western Nigeria
and Lagos as an independent sovereign state to enter into association with
any of the Nigerian units of its own choosing, and on terms mutually
acceptable to them. I see no reason for departing from this mandate. If
any region in Nigeria considers itself strong enough to compel us to enter
into association with it on its own terms, I would only wish such a region
luck. But such luck, I must warn, will, in the long run be no better than
that which has attended the doings of all colonial powers down the ages.
This much I must say in addition, on this point. We have neither military
might nor the overwhelming advantage of numbers here in Western Nigeria
and Lagos. But we have justice of a noble and imperishable cause on our
side, namely: the right of a people to unfettered self-determination. If
this is so, then God is on our side, and if God is with us then we have
nothing whatsoever in this world to fear.
The fourth imperative, and the second conditional one has been
fully dealt with in my recent letter to the Military Governor of Western
Nigeria, Col. Robert Adebayo, and in the representation which your
deputation made last year to the head of the Federal Military Government,
Lt. Col. Yakubu Gowon. As a matter of fact, as far back as November last
year a smaller meeting of leaders of thought in this Region decided that
unless certain things were done, we would no longer participate in the
meeting of the ad hoc committee. But since then, not even one of our
legitimate requests has been granted. I will, therefore, take no more of
your time in making further comments on a point with which you are well
familiar. As soon as our humble and earnest requests are met, I shall be
ready to take my place on the ad hoc committee. But certainly, not before.
In closing, I have this piece of advice to give. In order to resolve
amiably and in the best interests of all Nigerians certain attributes are
required on the part of Nigerian leaders, military as well as non-military
leaders alike, namely: vision, realism and unselfishness. But above all ,
what will keep Nigerian leaders in the North and East unwaveringly in the
path of wisdom, realism and moderation is courage and steadfastness on the
part of Yoruba people in the course of what they sincerely believe to be
right, equitable and just. In the past five years we in the West and Lagos
have shown that we possess these qualities in a large measure. If we
demonstrate them again as we did in the past, calmly and heroically, we
will save Nigeria from further bloodshed and imminent wreck and, at the
same time, preserve our freedom and self-respect into the bargain.
May God rule and guide our deliberations here, and endow all the
Nigerian leaders with the vision, realism, and unselfishness as well as
courage and steadfastness in the course of truth, which the present
circumstances demand. "
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